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The new discrimination and child care 
Patricia Apps  
Introduction 
Over the last decade a number of countries, notably the USA, the 
UK and Australia, have introduced new tax and welfare programs, 
or expanded existing programs, that have the effect of raising tax 
rates on the income of the second earner in the family. Examples 
include the earned income tax credit (EITC) program in the USA,
1
 
the child tax credit (CTC) and working tax credit (WTC) programs 
in the UK, and the Family Tax Benefit (FTB) system in Australia. 
Since the second earner is typically the female partner, these 
programs also have the effect of increasing the net-of-tax gender 
wage gap. Many of the same countries have poorly developed, high-
cost child care sectors, and so reducing the net wage of the second 
earner can make child care unaffordable from her net earnings. In 
a recent paper (Apps 2006a), I referred to this phenomenon as the 
‘new discrimination’. Unlike the ‘old discrimination’, which took 
the form of lower gross wage rates and poorer opportunities for 
women in the labour market, the new discrimination is located in 
government policy. 
This paper investigates the extent to which the second earner in 
Australian families has become subject to this new discrimination. 
The analysis compares effective tax rates on primary and second 
incomes and identifies the changes introduced in the 2006–07 
Budget. A key finding of the study is that second earners in families 
on less than average wages now face the highest average tax rates in 
the economy. This outcome is identified as a consequence of a 
series of changes in four key policy instruments used by government 
to set tax rates on family incomes: the personal income tax 
schedule, Family Tax Benefits, the Medicare Levy and the low 
income tax offset.  
                                                     
1 See Ellwood and Liebman (2000) and Eissa and Hoynes (2005) for studies 
that identify the changes in effective tax rates introduced by these 
programs. 
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Changes in these policy instruments under the Howard 
government have introduced a major restructuring of effective rates 
on the incomes of married couples with children. Second earners, 
at any given level of income, no longer face the same marginal and 
average tax rates as primary earners, as they would under a 
progressive individual income tax. Instead they face much higher 
marginal rates, and therefore much higher average rates, from the 
first dollar earned, consistent with a system of joint taxation. As a 
result, a two-earner family working long hours in the market can 
pay close to the same amount of tax as a single-earner family with 
the same income and one parent working full-time at home. This is 
a defining feature of joint taxation. 
A central assumption of the argument for joint taxation is that 
the combined income of parents provides a reliable measure of 
family living standards and, therefore, that distributional effects can 
be assessed on the basis of tax burdens as a percentage of family 
income. A recent example is the OECD’s (2006) comparisons of tax 
burdens as a percentage of the combined gross wage earnings of 
couples.
2
 This is a mistake. Combined earnings do not provide a 
reliable measure of living standards unless households with the 
same gross wage rates and family responsibilities make the same 
labour supply and domestic work choices. The data show they  
do not.  
Household survey data indicate a very high degree of 
heterogeneity in the labour supply of married mothers across 
seemingly identical families. In fact, the distribution tends to be 
bimodal. In a large proportion of families, the mother works full-
time at home providing child care and related services, and in an 
almost equally large proportion she works full-time in the market 
using her income to buy-in substitute services.
3
 A young family in 
which both parents work full-time to earn, say $80 000 per annum, 
cannot be considered to have the same standard of living as another 
in which one parent alone can earn $80 000 in the market while the 
                                                     
2 See Tables III.5c, p.92, III.6c, p.95, and III.7c, p.98. 
3 For a life cycle analysis that shows this using Australian data see Apps and 
Rees (2003). 
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other works full-time at home.
4
 A tax system that imposes equal 
burdens on these families is unfair. When the work choices of 
parents vary in this way, a progressive individual income tax system 
is required for fairness in the treatment of families with the same 
standard of living, and of those with varying living standards, that is, 
for horizontal and vertical equity.  
It is also well established that individual taxation is superior to 
joint taxation for efficiency reasons. Extensive empirical research 
indicates that the labour supply of married mothers tends to be 
more responsive to a fall in the net wage than that of prime aged 
males. The result has a straightforward explanation. After the 
arrival of the first child, home production, in particular home child 
care, becomes a close substitute for market alternatives. As a result, 
the labour supply of the parent with the lower wage becomes more 
highly responsive to a fall in the net wage because it reduces the 
implicit price of services produced at home relative to the price of 
the market alternatives. In other words, high effective tax rates on 
the second earner create a large wedge5 between the market and 
home price of child care,6 and can therefore be expected to have a 
strong negative effect on female labour supply and, in turn, on the 
tax base and overall efficiency of the economy. This is consistent 
with the well-established Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) result on the 
taxation of couples – an individual tax system with lower  
marginal rates on married women as second earners is required  
for efficiency.7 
                                                     
4 The argument against this proposition implies two key assumptions: that a 
parent working full-time at home caring for young children is unproductive 
and her life of leisure is supported by an altruistic hand-out from her 
husband equal to half his income.  
5 See Jaumotte (2003) for estimates of the ‘tax wedge’ for OECD countries, 
calculated as the ratio of the effective tax on the second earner’s income 
and the tax she would face as a single individual with the same income. 
6 As does high-cost, for profit, child care in an imperfect capital market (see 
Apps and Rees, 2003). 
7 The Boskin and Sheshinski analysis is an application of the Ramsey 
pricing rule: for efficiency, effective tax rates should be related inversely to 
(compensated) wage/price elasticities. For a more recent empirical analysis 
which comes to a similar conclusion, see Feldstein and Feenberg (1996). 
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The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 uses data for a 
sample of ‘in-work’ families drawn from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) 2003–04 Survey of Income and Housing (SIH) to 
show, first, the extent to which low and average wage families 
working long hours can be misrepresented as high wage earners 
according to a welfare ranking defined on household income. 
Section 3 goes on to identify the distribution of tax burdens across 
single and two-earner families, and the effective rates that apply to 
the incomes of primary and second earners, using the same data 
set. The section also presents results for the changes introduced  
in the 2006–07 Budget. A concluding comment is contained in 
Section 4. 
Household income – an unfair tax base 
Household income, with or without an equivalence scale 
adjustment, is a seriously misleading measure of family living 
standards because it omits the implicit income from household 
production. Studies that attempt to assess the distributional impact 
of a tax reform based on changes in net household income can be 
shown to imply a model of the family that ignores two empirically 
important observations: (i) that household production, and 
especially home child care, becomes a close substitute for bought-in 
market services after the arrival of the first child, and (ii) that there 
is a high degree of heterogeneity in the labour supply of married 
mothers across families with the same earning capacities and 
demographic characteristics (see Apps & Rees 1999, 2005).  
The second observation – heterogeneity in market versus 
domestic work choices – is central. If families with the same wage 
rates and demographic characteristics were observed to make the 
same time allocation decisions, then, all else being equal, 
household income could be found to be strongly correlated with 
wage rates, and therefore with living standards. However, with 
heterogeneity in the labour supply of one parent, this is no longer 
the case. Moreover, the problem of ‘ranking errors’ becomes 
especially serious when, as the analysis to follow will show, the 
profile of primary wage earnings for full-time work is relatively  
flat across the middle of the distribution and then rises sharply at 
the top. 
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The analysis is based on data for a sample of 1945 two-parent 
families from the ABS 2003–04 SIH survey selected on the criteria 
that the family is a couple income unit with dependent children 
and at least one parent is employed and earning above $15 000 per 
annum. These criteria exclude very few records. Less than a quarter 
of one per cent of two-parent families reports both parents as 
unemployed.
8
 The sample is also limited to families with earnings 
principally from wages and salaries and with non-negative incomes 
from earnings, investments and unincorporated enterprises. All 
incomes reported in this section are indexed to the 2006–07 
financial year.  
The parent with the higher private income is defined as the 
‘primary earner’. Private income, as defined by the ABS (2005), is 
income from all non-government sources such as wages and 
salaries, profits, investment income and superannuation. The 
primary earner is the male partner in 87 per cent of records and 
therefore in much of the discussion to follow the second earner will 
be referred to as the female partner.  
Table 4.1 reports the incomes and employment status of primary 
and second earners across a quintile ranking of families defined on 
primary income.9 From the table it can be seen that 93.4 per cent of 
primary earners are employed full-time and 6.6 per cent are in part-
time work, reflecting the fact that there is very little variation in the 
labour supply of working age males. This contrasts with a high 
degree of heterogeneity in the labour supply of working age 
females, as indicated by the widely varying full-time and part-time 
employment rates within each quintile. Of second earners, only 
29.7 per cent are in full-time work and 36.4 per cent in part-time 
work. The remainder – over a third – is not in the workforce. 
 
                                                     
8 Of male partners in all two-parent families, 83.6 per cent are in full-time 
work, 6.7 per cent are in part-time work and 2.5 per cent are unemployed. 
Of married mothers in the same sample, 27.9 per cent are in full-time 
employment, 37.6 per cent are in part-time work and 2.3 per cent report 
being unemployed. 
9 Note that asset income is given by the difference between income and 
earnings and, on average, contributes little to family incomes except in the 
top quintile.  
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Table 4.1 Quintile distribution of ‘in-work’ families by primary 
income 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Primary earner 
Primary income $pa 31 004 43 680 54 445 67 417 120 055 63 447 
Primary earnings $pa 30 739 42 972 53 831 65 677 114 523 61 663 
% employed full-time 84.6 94.1 94.0 97.6 96.9 93.4 
Second earner       
Second income $pa 11 736 18 888 21 203 24 701 26 862 20 670 
Second earnings $pa 11 185 17 809 20 560 23 344 22 978 19 159 
% employed full time 25.4 34.6 32.2 30.8 25.6 29.7 
% employed part time 29.9 34.4 37.4 42.2 38.1 36.4 
 
Note the relatively flat profile of primary income and earnings 
across quintiles 2 to 4. Within each quintile we can expect 
considerable variation in the second income, given the variation in 
employment status. Thus, a ranking defined on household income 
could well place a two-earner family working long hours for 
relatively low wages near the top quintile, due to the relatively flat 
profile of primary earnings across the middle quintiles. To show this 
more clearly, Table 4.2 presents data means for the incomes and 
labour supplies of two household groups of equal size, labelled 
Type 1 and Type 2, defined according to hours worked by the 
second earner. Type 1 households are those in which the second 
earner’s annual hours are below the median of the sample, and 
Type 2, those in which her hours are above the median.  
Figure 4.1 plots the primary and second hours profiles of the 
two household types, and Figure 4.2, the corresponding earnings 
profiles. The figures show graphically the very large gap between 
the average hours worked by the second earner of each type, and 
the correspondingly large gap between average second earnings, 
within each quintile. In contrast to second earners, the average 
primary earner in both household types works almost the same 
hours and has similar earnings, reflecting similar gross wage rates, 
except in the top quintile. It is evident from these profiles that little 
of the variation in female labour supply can be explained by 
primary wage rates, other than in the top quintile. Nor can it be 
explained adequately by demographics. The average number of 
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dependent children in the Type 1 household is 2.0 and in the Type 
2 household, 1.8.  
 
Table 4.2 Quintile distribution by primary income and household 
type, 2006–07 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Type 1 
Primary earnings $pa 30 701 43 254 53 971 66 044 123 004 64 016 
Second earnings $pa 3632 6542 8214 10 821 9755 19 159 
Primary market hours pa  2058 2273 2326 2362 2544 2314 
Second market hours pa 54 272 289 447 202 253 
Type 2 
Primary earnings $pa 30 779 42 705 53 685 65 258 105 287 59 193 
Second earnings $pa 19047 28494 33340 37655 37404 19159 
Primary market hours pa  2132 2233 2269 2386 2508 2303 
Second market hours pa 1754 1899 1949 1991 1873 1892 
 
Figure 4.1 Family labour supplies by household type 
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Figure 4.2 Primary and second earnings by household type 
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We know from time use data that mothers who withdraw from 
market work after the first child spend long hours providing home 
child care and related services that they would otherwise need to 
buy-in, unless they have access to an ‘extended family’ arrangement 
(see Apps & Rees 2003, 2005). It is therefore essential to take 
account of home production in a measure of family welfare, in 
order to avoid the potential for large ranking errors as indicated by 
Table 4.2. For example, the average joint income of Type 2 families 
in quintile 2 is close to that of Type 1 families in quintile 4, yet 
much, if not all, of the net-of-tax second income of a Type 2 family 
may be spent on bought-in child care. Under these conditions, 
primary income is likely to be a far more reliable indicator of family 
living standards. 
To highlight further the potential for ranking errors of this 
kind, Table 4.3 presents the earnings profiles of Type 1 and Type 2 
families, for a ranking by household income. The table also reports 
the quintile distribution of the household types and the hours they 
work. Over half of the two-earner families in the bottom quintile of 
primary income are shifted to a higher quintile, and only 30 per 
cent remain in the bottom two quintiles. It is evident from the 
earnings and hours profiles that a ranking by household income is 
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driven by the market hours of the second earner, rather than by 
wage rates, and therefore indirectly by the omission of implicit 
income from home production in household income as the  
ranking variable. 
Table 4.3 Quintile distribution by household income and 
household type 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Household income $pa 37 057 57 841 74 557 94 332 15 3981 84 117 
% type 2 24.4 35.4 52.4 67.4 63.6 50.0 
Type 1        
Primary earnings $pa 35 050 51 837 62 595 73 545 136 289 64 016 
Primary market hours pa  2118 2260 2362 2389 2563 2314 
Second market hours pa 56 226 430 471 286 253 
Type 2        
Primary earnings $pa 29 135 37 866 45 841 58 968 92 885 59 193 
Primary market hours pa  2132 2140 2284 2321 2452 2303 
Second market hours pa 1620 1809 1917 1904 2004 1892 
Family tax system 
We now turn to the structure of effective tax rates on the incomes 
of family members, due to the interaction of personal income tax 
with the FTB system, the low income tax offset and Medicare Levy. 
Marginal and average rates on primary and second earnings are 
computed for the sample of ‘in-work’ families described in the 
previous section, and reported for a ranking defined on primary 
income as in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Results are presented for two 
financial years, 2005–06 and 2006–07, to show the impact of 
changes in the 2006–07 Budget on the distribution of the family tax 
burden between primary and second earners. All incomes are 
indexed to the relevant financial year.  
Table 4.4 reports, in row 1, the amount of tax the representative 
family in each quintile would pay if the second earner did not go 
out to work.
10
 The figures therefore give estimates of the average 
amount of tax families would pay on primary earnings and asset 
income in each quintile, if second earnings were zero. The overall 
                                                     
10 All figures are weighted means. 
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average is $6648 per annum. The second row of the table reports 
the resulting average tax rate (ATR) on primary earnings and asset 
income. For the full sample, the ATR is 10.3 per cent. In other 
words, if all second earners withdrew from work, the overall average 
rate of tax on family income would be 10.3 per cent.  
The third row of the table shows the tax on the income of the 
second earner, calculated for each record as the increment in the 
family’s tax burden due to her participation in the labour market. 
The overall average is $6266 pa. The final row gives the quintile 
profile of ATRs on second earnings. The overall ATR on the second 
income is 32.7 per cent, more than three times the ATR on primary 
earnings and asset income. 
Table 4.4 Tax burdens on ‘in-work’ families, Budget 2006–07  
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
All families – zero second earnings   
Tax on income* $pa -7401 -1669 2929 8353 30 760 6648 
ATR % -23.6 -3.7 5.3 12.1 24.8 10.3 
Second earner       
Tax on second earnings $pa 3871 6314 6538 7197 7425 6266 
ATR on second earnings % 34.6 35.4 31.8 30.8 32.3 32.7 
* Primary earnings and asset income 
These results indicate a very high degree of tax discrimination 
against the second earner. The average tax paid by the 
representative family in the sample is $12 914, the sum of the 
amount paid as a single-earner family, $6648, and the tax on second 
earnings, $6266. Thus, if all families had only one earner or, 
equivalently, if all second earners withdrew from work, average tax 
per family in the sample would fall from $12 914 pa to $6648 pa, 
that is, by 48.5 per cent. This dramatic fall is due to very high 
effective ATRs on second earnings. ATRs on primary income, and 
therefore on the incomes of single-earner families, are not only  
low on average but highly progressive. We have a negative income 
tax up to the second quintile, with those in quintile 1 receiving a 
net transfer that averages $7401 per annum. The ATR rises to  
5.3 per cent in quintile 3, and to 24.8 per cent in quintile 5. This 
progressive taxation of primary incomes contrasts with the 
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treatment of second earnings. Not only are ATRs on second 
earnings much higher, at over 30 per cent in all quintiles, the 
highest rate appears in quintile 2.  
In an earlier paper I made the same calculation for the 2005–06 
financial year using data for a sample of ‘in-work’ families from the 
earlier ABS 2002–03 SIH survey (Apps 2006b). The data for the 
sample of families selected for the present study, with incomes 
indexed to 2005–06, yield very similar figures. The results are 
presented in Table 4.5 in the same format as Table 4.4, showing in 
addition the changes in ATRs that flowed from the tax cuts 
introduced in the 2006–07 Budget.  
The changes in ATRs reveal an especially interesting outcome of 
the 2006–07 Budget. The average family tax burden is computed as 
$14 415 for 2005–06, and found to fall to $8196 when calculated to 
exclude second earnings. This implies an effective average tax 
burden on the second earner of $6219 per annum, which is 43.4 
per cent of the overall average family tax burden. Thus, the changes 
in the 2006–07 Budget increased the relative share of the burden 
on the second earner, from 43.4 per cent to over 48.5 per cent – a 
rise of over 5 percentage points.  
Table 4.5 Tax burdens on ‘in-work’ families, Budget 2005–06 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Panel 1 
Tax on income* $pa -6303 -92 4176 9560 33596 8196 
ATR% -20.4 -0.0 7.7 14.2 27.7 12.9 
2006–07 change in ATR -3.2 -3.7 -2.4 -2.1 -2.9 -2.6 
Panel 2       
Tax on second earnings $pa 4286 5940 6285 7175 7411 6219 
ATR% 39.1 34 31.2 31.4 32.8 33.1 
2006–07 change in ATR -4.5 1.4 0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 
*Primary earnings and asset income 
The higher relative burden on the second earner is a consequence 
of reducing the absolute burden on the primary earner, from an 
average of $8196 to $6648, while leaving the absolute burden on the 
second earner almost unchanged. The fall in the tax burden on 
primary earnings and asset income results in an overall reduction in 
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the ATR on that income of 2.6 percentage points and, within each 
quintile, a consistent gain of over 2 percentage points. In contrast, 
the overall change in the ATR on second earnings is close to zero.
11
 
There is a more substantial gain in quintile 1, of 4.5 percentage 
points, but this is then offset by losses in quintiles 2 and 3. In other 
words, the tax burden on second earners in these low-income 
quintiles actually increased in absolute value, due to the 2006–07 
Budget changes. 
The shift in the overall family tax burden to the second earner 
was achieved by combining personal income tax cuts for high 
income earners with tax-cuts for average income single-earner 
families through the expansion of the FTB system and tax cuts for 
very low income earners through the expansion of the low income 
tax offset. In the discussion to follow, the specific changes in these 
policy instruments in the 2006–07 Budget are explained in some 
detail, to show how they shift the tax burden to the second earner. 
Table 4.6, Panel 1, lists the personal income tax rate  
schedules and thresholds for 2005–06 and 2006–07 financial years. 
The rise in the $21 600 threshold to $25 000 provides a tax cut of 
$510 per annum for an individual within the income range of  
$25 000 to $63 000 pa. The shift in the threshold of $63 000 to  
$75 000 for the 30 cents in the dollar rate gives an individual with 
an income of $75 000 an additional tax cut of $1440. For someone 
on an income of $150 000, these changes, together with the top 
threshold and rate changes, provide a total tax cut of $6200. Thus 
the personal income tax changes are very generous to the top, give 
little to the middle, and offer nothing to the bottom. 
A tax cut for very low-income earners is provided by increasing 
the low income tax offset, from $235 to $600. The argument for an 
offset of this kind usually runs as follows. The aim of government is 
to reduce taxes on low and average income workers. One way of 
achieving this is to raise the zero-rated threshold to, say, $10 000. 
However, the resulting gain of $600 would go to all taxpayers above 
this threshold, including those on $150 000. And so, it is typically 
                                                     
11 Note that even though the tax on second earnings rose slightly in 2006–
07, the increase was not in line with the indexed rise in earnings. This 
explains the fall in the overall ATR of 0.4 of a percentage point. 
87 
argued,12 a more effective use of government revenue is achieved by 
targeting the tax cut to the preferred low-income group through a 
tax offset.  
Table 4.6 Income tax schedule and low income tax offset  
Panel 1 Income tax schedule 
2005–06: Taxable income  MTR*  2006–07: Taxable income  MTR  
$0–$6000 
$6001–$21 600 
$21 601–$63 000 
$63 001–$95 000 
$95 000 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.30 
0.42 
0.47 
$0–$6000 
$6001–$25 000 
$25 001–$75 000 
$75 001–$150 000 
$150 000 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.30 
0.40 
0.45 
Panel 2 Income tax schedule and low income tax offset 
2005–06: Taxable income MTR 2006–07 Taxable income MTR 
$0–$7567 
$7568–$21 600 
$21 601–$27 475 
$27 476–$63 000 
$63 001–$95 000 
$95 000 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.34 
0.30 
0.42 
0.47 
$0–$10 000 
$10 001–25 000 
$25 001–$40 000 
$40 001–$75 000 
$75001–$150 000 
$150 00 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.34 
0.30 
0.40 
0.45 
*Marginal tax rate 
Limiting the tax cut to those on low incomes is, however, clearly not 
the concern of the Howard government, given the large tax cuts at 
the top. To the contrary, the purpose of the offset is to deny those 
across a wide middle band of the earnings distribution, specifically 
from $40 000 to $63 0000, a tax cut of $600, while simultaneously 
providing much larger cuts at higher income levels. This is evident 
from Panel 2 of the table, which lists the effective MTR schedules in 
the two financial years incorporating the low income tax offset. In 
effect, the offset raises the MTR on incomes from $25 000 to $40 
000 to 34 cents in the dollar, thereby introducing a ‘hump’ in the 
MTR profile across relatively low incomes. The offset is, in fact, an 
entirely redundant policy instrument. The same rate changes could 
have been announced simply, and more transparently, as the new 
MTR schedule shown in Panel 2. This would, of course, clarify the 
                                                     
12 The argument, of course, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
role of the different policy instruments in setting the tax rate structure, as 
discussed in section 2 of Apps (2006b).  
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role of the offset as that of limiting to $510 the personal income tax 
cut for a parent earning from $40 000 and $63 000. 
However, not every parent within this income range is denied a 
more substantial gain. As in previous budgets, single-earner 
families, and those in which the second earner’s income is more 
marginal, are compensated through the FTB system. It is only two-
earner families with a more equal division of income who are left 
out in the cold. The increase in the lower income threshold for the 
withdrawal of FTB Part A from $34 290 ($33 361 in 2005–06) to  
$40 000 provides a tax cut of $1142 for each child up to the income 
level at which this gain is the remaining amount to be  
withdrawn. For the two-earner family in which the second earner 
has a more significant workforce attachment, the gain can be 
entirely lost at relatively low wage levels because FTB Part A is 
withdrawn on joint income.  
The following tables illustrate the impact of the system in  
2005–06, and of the changes introduced in the 2006–07 Budget, for 
the family with three children under 12, including one under 5 
years, and with income from earnings only. Table 4.7 first of all lists 
effective marginal tax rate rates and thresholds for the single-earner 
family, for the two financial years. The rates are calculated to 
include income taxes, the low income tax offset, the Medicare Levy 
and FTBs Part A and Part B. Since second earnings are zero, the 
family is eligible for the full amount of FTB Part B, that is, for 
$3372.60 in 2005–06 and $3467.50 in 2006–07. 
The MTR profiles in both years exhibits a much stronger ‘hump’ 
or inverted U-shape, due to the withdrawal of FTB Part A at 20 cents 
in the dollar from $33 362 in 2005–06 and $40 000 in 2006–07, and 
the withdrawal of the Medicare Levy low income exemption. The 
second hump in the profiles further along the distribution is due to 
the withdrawal of the base rate of FTB Part A at 30 cents in the 
dollar. Since both FTB Part A and the Medicare Levy exemption are 
withdrawn on joint income, a second earner going out to work 
within the income range of the first ‘hump’ will face an effective tax 
rate that includes the withdrawal rates of both. In addition, she will 
lose an extra 20 cents in the dollar due to the withdrawal of FTB 
Part B. The end result is an income tax system that very closely 
approximates one of joint taxation across much of the distribution 
of family income, but with a difference. Under a conventional joint 
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tax (or income splitting) system, the MTR schedule is typically 
progressive. Australian families face an inverted U-shaped schedule. 
Table 4.7 Effective marginal tax rates schedules for the single-
earner family 
2005–06 2006–07 
Taxable income  MTR Taxable income  MTR 
$0–$7567 
$7568–$21 600 
$21 601–$27 475 
$27 476–$33 361 
$33 362–$34 226 
$34 227–$37 001 
$37 002–$63 000 
$63 001–$69 715 
$69 716–$93 074 
$93 075–$95 000 
$95 001–$110 850 
    $110 850+ 
0.00 
0.15 
0.34 
0.30 
0.50 
0.70 
0.515 
0.635 
0.435 
0.735 
0.785 
0.485 
$0–$10 000 
$10 001–$25 000 
$25 001–$35 048 
$35 049–$40 000 
$40 001–$41 232 
$41 233–$75 000 
$75 001–$77 336 
$77 337–$95 631 
$95 632–$113 911 
$113 912–$150 000 
$150 000 + 
0.00 
0.15 
0.34 
0.44 
0.60 
0.515 
0.615 
0.415 
0.715 
0.415 
0.465 
 
Because the 2006–07 Budget reduces tax burdens for the 
average income single-earner family by raising the threshold for the 
withdrawal of FTB Part A and lowering the rate of withdrawal for 
the Medicare Levy exemption, the hump in the MTR profile shifts 
along the distribution, and is also extended, as shown in Table 4.7. 
The Budget changes therefore have the effect of bringing more 
families on average incomes into the net of a system of joint 
taxation with an inverted U-shaped MTR schedule. The second 
earner can face especially high effective MTRs and ATRs as she 
increases her hours of work if the primary earner of the family falls 
within the income range of the first hump in the MTR profile. 
Table 4.8 gives, as an example, the MTRs and ATRs on the second 
earnings of a family in which primary income is $40 000 pa in both 
financial years. 
In 2005–06 the second earner lost almost half her income at 
around $20 000. While the 2006–07 Budget reduced losses for 
second earners at lower income levels, it raised rates as her income 
approached that of the primary earner. At $40 000, for example, 
the second earner’s MTR and ATR are, in fact, higher in 2006–07. 
When both parents earn $40 000 per annum, a figure that is well 
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below average earnings, the second earner loses 47.5 per cent of 
her wages, which is more than she would have lost in the previous 
year. This is because the 2006–07 Budget changes were designed to 
exclude the family with more equal partner incomes from a gain 
from the rise in the FTB Part A lower income threshold to $40 000, 
and from a personal tax cut above $510 for each parent, by 
completely withdrawing the low income offset at $40 000. These 
measures not only have the effect of shifting the share of the family 
tax burden towards the second earner, they also shift the overall tax 
burden towards two-earner families in which each parent’s income 
ranges from around $40 000 to $63 000. Thus, while the new 
discrimination impacts directly on the second earner, its indirect 
effect is upon families in which both parents work full-time to earn 
similar but relatively low and average wages.  
Table 4.8 Second earner’s effective marginal and average tax rates* 
2005–06 2006–07 
Second earner’s 
taxable income 
MTR ATR Second earner’s 
taxable income 
MTR ATR 
$0–$4088 
$4089–$7567 
$7568–$20 951 
$20 952–$21 000 
$21 001–$27 475 
$27 476–$29 715 
$29 716–$40 000 
0.215 
0.415 
0.565 
0.365 
0.555 
0.515 
0.315 
0.215 
0.307 
0.472 
0.469 
0.487 
0.488 
0.444 
$0–$1232 
$1233–$4234 
$4235–$10 000 
$10 001–$21 572 
$21 573–$25 000 
$25 001–$37 337 
$37 338–$40 000 
0.30 
0.215 
0.415 
0.565 
0.365 
0.555 
0.355 
0.280 
0.240 
0.341 
0.461 
0.448 
0.483 
0.475 
* Primary earner income = $40 000 pa 
 
To give an indication of the distributional limitations of the federal 
government’s new tax system in 2006–07, Table 4.9 translates family 
tax burdens into ‘hours worked to pay tax’, or the ‘hours of work 
equivalent’ of the family’s tax, for Type 1 and Type 2 households, by 
quintiles of primary income. The first row for each type reports the 
average tax burden on families in each quintile, and the second 
row, hours worked to pay tax.  
In quintile 3, the average tax burden for the Type 2 household is 
equivalent to 764 hours of work for the government per year. This is 
more than the hours worked to pay tax by the average Type 1 
household in quintile 5 on a much higher income. The Type 2 
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household in quintile 2 works an average of 574 hours for the 
government. This is some 50 per cent higher than the hours 
reported for a Type 1 household in quintile 4, and is approaching 
the number of hours worked for the government by the Type 1 
household in quintile 5, on a very much higher primary income.  
Table 4.9 Hours worked to pay tax, by primary income and 
household type, 2006–07 
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 All 
Type 1       
Total tax $pa -6956 43 4412 10991 37 308 9456 
Hours worked to pay tax - - 155 394 687 - 
Type 2       
Total tax $pa 38 9010 14 720 20 760 39 141 16 545 
Hours worked to pay tax 
pa 
- 574 764 925 1177 - 
 
Taxes on second earners and their families at these levels, together 
with a lack of access to affordable, high quality child care, can be 
expected to have strong negative effects on female  
labour supply, not only during the child rearing years but 
throughout the life cycle (see Shaw 1994). This is evident from 
lifecycle time allocation profiles for selected OECD countries 
reported in Apps (2006a). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the Australian family tax system is 
fundamentally flawed as a result of policy changes that have 
transformed it from a progressive individual income tax system to 
one much more closely resembling joint taxation. These policies 
constitute what I have elsewhere labelled the ‘new discrimination’. 
The problem lies not in the level of family benefits, but in the 
effective marginal tax rate schedule created by the withdrawal of 
benefits on household income and the income of the second 
earner. The introduction of this new system over successive budgets 
has shifted the tax burden from single-earner to two-earner couples 
in a way that is bad for both efficiency and equity.  
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Policies that raise marginal rates on the second income tax more 
heavily the partner with the more elastic labour supply, in 
contradiction of the standard principle for minimising the 
deadweight efficiency loss from taxation. The resulting tax rate 
structure seriously inhibits the reallocation of female time from the 
household to the market during a period of declining fertility and 
therefore of falling demand for domestic labour.
13
  
Imposing high average tax rates on the second income also 
ignores the fact that of two households with the same total 
household income, where one has the second earner working 
entirely in the market, the other entirely in the household, the 
latter will have a significantly higher standard of living because of its 
higher level of output of household goods and services.  
Large family benefits can be justified as a response to market 
failure. Children, or their parents as their agents, cannot borrow on 
capital markets against their future incomes to finance their current 
consumption and investment in human capital, or obtain cover in 
insurance markets for the risks they face. In the absence of public 
support, not by financial transfers but by a publicly funded school 
system, there would be underinvestment in the next generation. It 
does not seem to be appreciated that a similar argument applies to 
child care, a badly neglected sector in Australia. A high quality, 
affordable, publicly provided child care system would more than 
repay itself in expanded female labour supply and the likely 
increase in fertility that would result from making it more feasible 
for women to combine a career with having children. 
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